This post is a supporting blog for a video I just published (at the bottom of this post) called 'Down the Rabbit Hole - A Shocking Discovery. This is some of the research I carried out using GROK. I asked a simple question:
What would happen if a high altitude electromagnetic pulse was detonated over the US?
Here is the unedited answer:
A high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) detonation over the United States would cause widespread disruption and damage to electronics and the power grid over a large area, potentially most of the continental U.S., with cascading effects on critical infrastructure and society. Exact severity depends on yield, altitude (typically tens to hundreds of km), location, and assumptions about field strengths and system vulnerabilities. There is real disagreement among experts on the scale and duration of impacts.
How HEMP Works
A nuclear explosion above the atmosphere generates three main pulse components:
- E1 (early-time, nanoseconds): Fast, high-intensity fields (tens of kV/m in peak areas). These couple into wires and cables or radiate directly, damaging or upsetting semiconductors, computers, digital controls, protective relays, and communications equipment.
- E2 (intermediate): Similar to lightning; generally less unique as a standalone threat if surge protection works, but it can compound damage if E1 has already disabled protections.
- E3 (late-time, seconds to minutes): Slow, low-frequency fields that induce quasi-DC currents in long conductors (power lines, pipelines), similar to a severe geomagnetic storm. This can saturate transformers, cause heating, voltage collapse, and blackouts.
Coverage is defined by line-of-sight to the horizon. A burst at a few hundred km over the central U.S. can illuminate most of the continental United States (and parts of Canada/Mexico), though peak fields are not uniform (often stronger in a crescent-shaped region equatorward of the burst).
Historical Context
The 1962 U.S. Starfish Prime test (1.4 Mt at ~400 km over the Pacific) produced EMP effects that knocked out streetlights, set off alarms, and disrupted communications in Hawaii ~1,400 km away. It also damaged satellites and created artificial radiation belts. Modern solid-state electronics are far more susceptible than 1960s systems.
Effects on the Power Grid
This is the most studied and consequential area:
- EMP Commission (congressional reports 2004–2017): Assessed HEMP as an existential threat. A single attack could degrade at least 70% of electrical service in affected regions, with functional collapse and recovery times of months to years (possibly a year or longer for a nationwide blackout). Control systems (SCADA) were highly vulnerable in tests. Cascading failures would hit dependent systems.
- EPRI 2019 study (with utilities, DOE, and national labs): More moderate for the bulk transmission system. Moderate E1 could disrupt/damage ~5% of digital protective relays (up to ~15% in severe cases); E2 minimal impact; E3 could cause multi-state regional blackouts with limited immediate damage to large power transformers (on the order of 3–21 at risk). Combined effects could hinder recovery, but the study did not support years-long CONUS-wide collapse. Mitigations exist (shielded cables, surge protection, spares, GIC blocking).
Critics of EPRI (including some Commission-linked analyses) argue it used lower field strengths than some Soviet-test-based estimates (e.g., higher E3 peaks) and focused only on transmission. CISA has noted that basic HEMP capabilities are more likely to cause regional disruption than continental catastrophe, while advanced attacks in a broader conflict could be more damaging.
Other Infrastructure and Electronics
- Electronics and communications: Widespread disruption or damage to unprotected digital systems, phones, computers, radios, cell towers, and data networks. Some tested systems (e.g., certain LTE equipment with shielding/fiber) showed resilience at high fields. Satellites in the line of sight or radiation belts can be damaged.
- Vehicles: EMP Commission tests (mostly 1980s–early 2000s cars) showed limited effects—running vehicles more vulnerable (some stalled above ~25–30 kV/m), many only had nuisance issues, and off vehicles were largely unaffected. Modern vehicles with more electronics and longer wiring are expected to be more susceptible, but total fleet failure is unlikely. Older pre-electronics cars are more resilient.
- Other systems: Water/sewage pumps and treatment, fuel distribution (electric pumps), refrigeration, hospitals (generator fuel limits and electronics vulnerability), banking/ATMs, transportation controls, and industrial processes would be hit hard by power and control-system losses.
Societal Consequences
Immediate effects would include large-scale blackouts, loss of communications, and failure of electronics-dependent services. Cascading failures in interdependent infrastructure (power → water, food, fuel, medical, logistics) would follow. Modern society relies on just-in-time supply chains and constant power.
Recovery would depend on the extent of permanent damage (especially hard-to-replace large transformers and control electronics) versus temporary disruption. Estimates range from weeks/months regionally (more optimistic engineering views) to prolonged periods with severe hardship (Commission assessments). The widely cited “90% of the population could die” figure is an expert judgment (from Commission chair William Graham in 2008 testimony regarding a novel’s long blackout scenario, and earlier related testimony) about extreme, prolonged nationwide outages leading to starvation, disease, and societal collapse—not a detailed modeled prediction. It is contested and tied to the most severe assumptions.
In short: It would be a severe, high-impact event capable of causing regional-to-widespread disruption of modern life, power outages lasting from days to potentially much longer in hard-hit areas, and major challenges to recovery and public order. It is not a blast/heat/radiation event that destroys cities physically, but an electromagnetic one targeting technology. Debates center on precise field levels, cascading dynamics, and recovery timelines rather than whether effects would be serious. Some hardening and resilience work has occurred (especially for military and certain critical systems), but civilian infrastructure remains largely vulnerable.